16 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FBIS Field Bureaus

FROM : Chief, FBIS

SUBJECT : Letter of Instruction - Part I

## GENERAL

1. Supplement to Daily Report:

16 September - World Radio and Press Reaction to President Eisenhower's Speech of September 11.

## EDITORIAL COMMENT

- 1. London and Mediterranean Bureaus
- a. The terms "Sudan" and "Lebanon" should be used and not "The Sudan" and "The Lebanon."
- b. There is a wide general interest in all statements by religious leaders in the Soviet Union, and especially by Moslem spokesmen. Whenever circumstances permit such statements should be texted.

## 2. Far East Bureaus

a. The Bureaus' coverage of the crisis in the Taiwan Strait has generally been excellent, particularly during the early days of the month when they performed with exemplary efficiency in covering the fast-moving events and in achieving interbureau coordination. The numerous FYI's greatly facilitated wire service, and roundups of comment related to the developments enabled the Daily Report to reflect the full scope of Peking's propaganda beamed to domestic and external audiences.

In a crisis of this sort, the Daily Report has a twofold objective: one, to provide the intelligence community promptly with the major pronouncements disseminated by the radio; and two, to publish an adequate sample of collateral comment having a direct bearing on the political actions or currents which dominate the news.

Adequate coverage must be given to Peking's comment on such a major event as, for example, President Eisenhower's exchanges with Khrushchev on the Taiwan issue. At the same time, however, such reportage must be balanced by coverage of somewhat less dramatic events which may also have a direct bearing on the crisis: expressions of foreign support; calls for civilian or military mobilization; military activities; formation of militia units; production appeals linked to the crisis; completion of rail lines; and other reports of activities

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perhaps presaging possible courses of action by the country concerned. Our ability to retain the proper perspective so essential for a true assessment of events depends to a large degree on the editors' intelligent initiative and imagination, on their ability to recognize the needs of consumers, and to perform accordingly. Far East personnel in the past month have been markedly successful and are to be commended for their conscientious, professional work, accomplished despite numerous critical developments, inordinate work loads, and staffing problems.

b. In order to minimize the possibility of confusion among some readers of the Daily Report, bureaus should insure a consistent style of translating "hsien" as county and 'hsiang" as township, conforming to the general NCNA English rendering of these terms.

## 3. Saigon Bureau

a. The Bureau's press scrutiny file continues to be well edited, fairly current, and of about the right volume, but there seems to have been a gradual shift of emphasis in the past few months in the direction of very heavy exploitation of certain publications and a correspondingly light treatment of others. While NHAN DAN and HOC TAP continue to be well represented, it is noted that the number of items filed from the army weekly QUAN DOI NHAN DAN has doubled since a year ago, while the number filed from the daily THOI MOI has fallen to perhaps a third of the former figure. Recently there have been no items from the Catholic CHINH NGHIA.

While it is recognized that local commitments and the difficulties involved in procuring certain newspapers, as well as the nature of the news itself, necessarily play a part in determining the nature of the Bureau's scrutiny file, there is a need for more material from some of the publications mentioned, and from others -- such as LAO DONG and CUU QUOC -- which speak for particular segments of DRV society. It is not suggested that the Bureau should increase the total volume of its scrutiny file; it is assumed that in a more balanced selection an increase in the file from one source would be counterbalanced by a reduction in the file of material from others, including QUAN DOI and NHAN DAN.

### FIELD SUPPORT OF THE RADIO PROPAGANDA BRANCH

1. 'Special roundups and FYIs from the Okinawa, Tokyo and West Coast Bureaus contributed materially to the daily analyses of bloc propagands on the Taiwan crisis disseminated on the FBIS Wire. An Austrian Bureau study of satellite newspaper comment on the crisis formed the basis for a Radio Propaganda Report on satellite statements of support for Communist China.

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2. All Bureaus are reminded of a requirement for prompt reportage when any Moscow and Peking programs are dropped from commentary lists. This includes programs dropped temporarily during a monitor's illness or vacation. For example, headquarters should have been informed promptly of the dropping of Moscow Persian language programs during the monitor's two-week leave.

ROCER G. SEELY

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S-E-C-R-E-T

16 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs, FBIS Field Bureaus

FROM : Chief, FBIS

SUBJECT : Letter of Instruction - Part II

## GENERAL

1. During September, requests for FBIS Wire Service were received from OSI, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense, and the Executive Secretariat, Department of State. Service will be initiated in the near future.

## 2. Other special services rendered by FBIS:

At the request of the Consulate General at Geneva, Bern was added as wire recipient for material sent to Geneva to service the U.S. representative at the meetings with the Chinese Communist representative in Warsaw. A copy of the file, which averaged 1000 words daily, was also requested by the Department of State for possible incorporation in departmental instructions and background information sent daily to the U.S. representative in Warsaw.

### 3. Radio Propaganda Reports:

- a. "Satellite Statements of Support for the CPR in the Taiwan Strait Crisis," incorporating research done at the Austrian Bureau.
- b. "Soviet Propaganda Hints at Nuclear Tests During Northern Fleet Maneuvers," updating and expanding data reported in three analysis items on the Wire.

## 4. Special propaganda analysis services:

- a. Twenty-four analyses of bloc propaganda on the Taiwan Strait crisis were disseminated on the FBIS Wire as part of the continuing service. Report No. 43 on the crisis was issued on 30 September. The Chief, China Branch, State Department OIRA/DRF indicated that FBIS' Wire analyses are being used as the main basis for cabled reviews of bloc propaganda for Ambassador Beam in Warsaw. Expressions of appreciation for this service have been received from the Chief, National Indications Center, the Deputy Assistant Director for Current Intelligence, Operations Coordination Board and State Department OIRA/DRF.
- b. A chronology of events relating to the Taiwan Strait situation, as broadcast by Soviet and Chinese Communist radios, was prepared at the request of State Department OIRA/DRS for the Secretary of State.

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- c. In addition to the 24 reports on the Taiwan Strait crisis, propaganda-analysis items on the Wire discussed:
  - (1) Background on the Soviet announcement of Northern Fleet maneuvers, together with a review of Moscow comment on the impending NATO maneuvers:
  - (2) Radio Moscow's reiteration, the day after the Northern Fleet maneuvers announcement, of Khrushchev's statement that the USSR considered itself relieved of its obligation to suspend nuclear testing;
  - (3) Moscow comment on the Northern Fleet maneuvers, hinting at resumed Soviet nuclear testing;
  - (4) Harsher criticism of President Eisenhower in Soviet comment following Khrushchev's 19 September letter to the President.

## EDITORIAL COMMENT

## 1. General

- a. It must again be pointed out that editors are not fully availing themselves of the latitude extended to them by the Editorial Handbook to revise noncritical material intercepted in the English language. Within the limitations prescribed in the Handbook, failure to smooth out faulty, unidiomatic English in the field inevitably poses a difficult time-consuming problem in headquarters in the preparation of copy for the Wire and Daily Report. In many cases, the need for headquarters wire and report personnel to work independently with substandard copy means that wire and book consumers will eventually be presented with alternative versions of the same item. Most appropriately, all questions concerning the adequacy of the original rendering of items should be resolved in the field, where editors have the opportunity to consult with monitors and crosscheck with other transmissions, possibly in other languages, to establish the permissible limits of the changes that can be made.
- b. Speeches of sufficient importance to merit preliminary FYI's or editorial reports almost without exception merit textual filing with priority precedence. Consumers alerted to the existence of such important items invariably anticipate that the text will be forthcoming without much delay. Failure to provide such texts within a reasonable time elicits repeated inquiries of the wire. In some cases, the expanded versions are distributed by local press services before the texts are available from our own sources, even though the initial FYI was filed substantially in advance of the first local press report.
- c. It would be extremely useful if editors would clearly label as such, expansions of items which have been sent previously so as to prevent undesirable duplication in cases where Daily Report editors do not handle the same sections from day to day. Occasionally expanded versions of important items published

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previously merit republication; just as frequently the longer versions are prepared for specific consumers, including the BBC, and do not contain sufficient new material to warrant republication.

d. All those bureaus preparing daily roundups should make an effort to keep their reviews in perspective by highlighting the major themes or developments and giving less emphasis to secondary items. On occasion, the single most important commentary is relegated to a subordinate position in favor of several others containing "juicy quotes", but which emanate from a relatively unimportant unauthoritative source.

## 2. East and West Coast Bureaus

a. While the use of FYI's to alert the wire and Projects Staff is to be encouraged, editors handling Latin American copy should remember that such FYI's cannot be readily processed for Daily Report use when they concern materials intercepted from broadcasts of more than one country. There is considerable consumer interest in Latin American coverage of major American pronouncements, such as a speech by President Eisenhower, even when the coverage consists merely of the broadcast of summaries or excerpts of the pronouncements without independent comment. The bureaus should increase the number of their FYI's reporting the scope and volume of such coverage, composed in such a manner that they can readily be incorporated in the appropriate country segments of the Daily Report.

#### 3. West Coast Bureau

- a. On several recent occasions, newsbreaks of major significance have been filed as briefs. Three specific cases in point were Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama's press conference on the Taiwan Strait crisis (CENTRAL NEWS, Aug. 29); Fujiyama's statement to the Diet on the same issue (CENTRAL NEWS, Aug. 29); and Prime Minister Kishi's invitation to President Nasir to visit Japan (PANASIA, Sept 3). Editors are referred in this connection to the September 1957 Letter of Instruction, which states that "by virtue of its rapid communications facilities ( the West Coast Bureau) often provides the first report of significant newsbreaks affecting Asian areas. It should not be taken for granted, therefore, that important items originating in Asian areas covered by other bureaus have already been received in Washington and necessitate only cursory treatment at WCB."
- b. In items dealing with Japan, care should be taken to render names in the Western order, with the surname coming last -- thus, Hisanari Yamada, not Yamada Hisanari.

### ADMINISTRATION

1. Personnel are reminded that hospitalization as a result of injury in line of duty is not payable by GRHA Insurance. All accidents should therefore be immediately reported on Form CA 1 and wA z to insure elegibility for Government compensation.

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#### S-E-C-R-E-T

- 2. Bureaus are again requested to inform headquarters of all shipments of household effects, surface freight, air freight and automobile immediately upon shipment. Since such messages are used by the Transportation Division and the U.S. Despatch Agent in clearing shipments through customs, it is also necessary that each message contain the employee's name, date of shipment, method of shipment, name of ship, weight, measurement, estimated time of arrival, and complete consignee address. Nonreceipt of advance shipping information results in delay and inconvenience for the traveler.
- 3. The Chief and Chief Engineer, FBIS left on 28 September for Panama on an inspection visit to the Panama Post.
- 4. The Chief, Administrative Staff, left on 27 September for a tour to include all field bureaus.

EL CHANGES	
New Employees in FBIS	
Name	Assignment
	Cruising Monitor ECB
	Editor WCB
	Editor Ed. Br.
	Analyst RPB
	Analyst RPB
	Clerk-typist Ed. Br.
	Librarian

S-E-C-R-E-T

Editor, ECB

From

To

Editor, Ed. Br.

50X1

Reassignments

Name

# Reassignments Cont'd

Name	From	To	
	Editor Ed. Br.	Editor ECB	50X′
	Chief, W.E., L.A. & N.E. Sec., Ed. Br.	Deputy Chief London Bureau	
	Senior Editor Ed. Br.	Senior Editor London Bureau	
	Senior Editor London Bureau	RPB	
	Editor Ed. Br.	Chief Monitor Hokkaido Bureau	
	Elec. Spec. MedBureau	Elec. Spec. Okinawa Bureau	
	Admin. Asst. Tokyo Bureau	Admin. Asst. ECB	
	Teletypist Ed. Br.	Teletypist WCB	
Transfers from FBIS	•		
Name	From		
	Teletypist WCB		50X <sup>2</sup>
Separations			
Name	From		
	Analyst RPB		50X <sup>2</sup>
	Monitor WCB		50X1
	Teletypist WCB		
	Clerk Typist Ed. Br.		
		ROCER G. SEELY	

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